Soft Law in the European Union - The Changing Nature of EU Law by Terpan, Fabien
Soft Law in the European Union The Changing Nature
of EU Law
Fabien Terpan
To cite this version:
Fabien Terpan. Soft Law in the European Union The Changing Nature of EU Law. European
Law Journal, Wiley, 2014, pp.40. <10.1111/eulj.12090>. <halshs-00911460>
HAL Id: halshs-00911460
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00911460
Submitted on 29 Nov 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sciences Po Grenoble 
working paper n.7 
 
 
 
Soft Law in the European Union  
The Changing Nature of EU Law 
Fabien TERPAN, Sciences po Grenoble, CESICE 
 
 
 
    November 2013 
 
 
 
Partners // 
 
      
 2 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT - This article is based on the assumption that there is a continuum running 
from non-legal positions to legally binding and judicially controlled commitments with, in 
between these two opposite types of norms, commitments that can be described as soft law. It 
aims at defining soft law in international relations in order to provide a mapping of EU law 
on the basis of the soft law / hard law divide. It helps categorize EU competences and public 
policies, and see how they fit with the distinction between two kinds of processes: legalization 
(transformation of non-legal norms into soft or hard law) and delegalization (transformation 
of hard law norms into soft law and evolution from hard to soft law).  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The European Union (EU) is often presented as the most advanced form of regional 
integration in the world. Scholars have long stressed the importance of law in the integration 
process 1  and differentiated EU law from international law, echoing the legal reasoning 
developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its landmark rulings of the early 1960s2. 
In their view, EU law, by imposing obligations and conferring rights both on individuals and 
Member States, constitutes an autonomous legal order distinct from international law and 
limiting the sovereignty of the Member States. Through key doctrines such as direct effect 
and primacy, the Court has exerted influence on the integration process and set the basis for 
the development of a European constitutionalism. The European treaties, considered as ‘the 
Constitutional Charter of the European Communities’3, are deemed to play the same role in 
the European Union as a constitution does in a state. The idea of a European 
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constitutionalisation has spread through EU scholarship in close relation with the ECJ’s case 
law. Law, as both the object and the instrument of integration, has helped the EU transform 
into a supranational polity. 
Thanks to the constitutional and law-making capacity displayed by the ECJ, the political 
system of the European Union has been ‘judicialized’, meaning that judicial law-making has 
affected ‘the strategic behaviour of non-judicial agents of governance’.4 Judicialization has 
become a core element of the so-called ‘Community method’, which is also characterized by 
a prominent role for the European Commission (initiative and implementation) and the 
European Parliament (co-decision), as well as qualified majority voting in the Council.  
At the same time, however, several policy areas have developed, in addition to the 
traditional Community method, through procedures that do not include judicial control by the 
European Court of Justice. The foreign and security policy has been working on an 
intergovernmental basis since the early 1970s. Plus, since the Maastricht treaty, different 
forms of coordination have taken place in fields such as social and economic policy, 
employment, environment, education and research. The Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) has become a central feature among these new forms of soft governance.5  Non-
judicialized policy areas have challenged the traditional ideals of EU law, suggesting that soft 
norms and coordination may provide a viable alternative to hard norms and the Community 
method.  
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it aims at identifying those EU norms 
belonging to the category of soft law. This can only be done by using a clear definition 
distinguishing soft law from both hard law and non-legal norms. Secondly, this paper tries to 
evaluate the importance of these soft norms in the European integration process. The focus is 
on the EU level only: very little attention is paid to the impact of these rules at the domestic 
level. As for the methodology, this paper uses secondary literature in order to propose a 
mapping of EU policy areas and explain how EU law has transformed over the years6. The 
objective is to look at the existing literature on EU public policies and characterize these 
policies along the soft law / hard law divide with a view to establishing the respective 
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proportion of soft and hard rules in EU law. This research should only be a first step, to be 
followed by further studies based on a quantitative as well as qualitative analysis of EU 
secondary legislation.  
The discussion about EU soft law is related to a larger debate on the ‘normalization’ of 
the European Union. There is a wide consensus among scholars working in EU studies that 
the Union cannot be considered as a traditional international organization. Three main 
features are emphasized to distinguish the EU from other organizations: the scale of the 
competences conferred to the EU, the supranational dimension of the Community method, 
and the impact of law in European integration (‘integration through law’). Soft governance 
and the use of soft law do not participate in this characterization of the European Union as a 
unique model of regional integration. On the contrary, it is widely acknowledged that EU law 
resembles state law, due to the principles of supremacy and direct effect as well as a 
sophisticated judicial architecture. EU law is different from the kind of law that usually 
applies in international relations. Being in close neighbourhood with state law, it is part of 
what most legal theorists would call the archetypal kind of law in modern societies.7 By 
contrast, international soft law would rather be considered as a primitive kind of law8 –or as 
not being law at all. If we assume that soft law in the EU is not intrinsically different from 
soft law in the international realm,9 then it can be argued that the more the EU uses soft law 
rules, the more it resembles a traditional intergovernmental organization. To say it differently, 
evolutions such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the OMC as well as 
other forms of coordination, because they heavily rely upon soft law instruments, participate 
in what can be called a normalization process (the transformation of the EU into a 
‘traditional’ organisation). Moving from hard law (state-like law) to soft law (primitive law) 
would entail an evolution from a federal-type organization to a more intergovernmental one. 
Conversely, if soft law remains an exception whereas hard law still is the rule, or if soft law 
appears to be no more than a transition towards harder kinds of rules, this means that the 
European Union has not entered into a phase of normalization, and is still a federal-type 
organization.  
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The mere existence of soft law is a controversial issue.10 Based on the traditional theory 
of legal acts, legal positivists usually say that law is either hard or not law at all, rejecting the 
mere idea of soft law. They argue that extending the frontiers of international law constitutes 
an artful move to accommodate an ever-growing legal scholarship.11 On the contrary, this 
article is based on the assumption that there is a continuum running from non-legal positions 
to legally binding and judicially controlled commitments with, in between these two opposite 
types of norms, commitments that can be described as soft law. The second section is devoted 
to defining soft law as an intermediary category in this norms continuum. The third section 
examines how EU norms fit with this definition, while the fourth evaluates the place of soft 
law within the whole spectrum of EU norms and its impact on EU law.  
 
II. Defining Soft Law in International Relations 
 
Soft law is not a clear-cut and uncontested category. This is not surprising, given that 
soft law, as a category of norms, is a doctrinal creation, which has no ground in positive law. 
Art. 38(1) of the ICJ Statute makes no reference to soft law as a possible source of 
international law. Art. 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does not 
mention soft law as a type of EU secondary legislation. Some would say that soft law is a 
useless and misleading concept that blurs the distinction between legal norms and politics 
instead of clarifying the nature and impact of law. I would rather argue that it is an abstraction 
that helps encapsulate the complexity of the European legal order while placing law in the 
wider social and political context. Yet, the difficulty with soft law is the very fluidity of the 
notion. Paradoxically, soft law is an oft-used concept, which is still given very different 
meanings as no consensus has emerged in scholarship.  
In order to identify soft law in the specific context of the European Union, we need to 
have a clear view of what soft law is made of, where it starts and where it ends. Drawing on 
existing attempts at defining soft law in international relations, I will propose a typology of 
soft law norms that will serve as a framework for a classification of EU norms.  
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 D. Thürer,  ‘Soft Law’, in R. Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (Elsevier, 2000) at 452; L. 
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A. Three Meanings of Soft Law in the Doctrinal Debate 
 
Soft law conveys different meanings depending on whether you situate soft norms in the 
category of binding or non-binding rules (see Table 1). Three possible meanings arise from 
the existing literature: #1 soft law is limited to non-binding norms with legal relevance; #2 
soft law is limited to binding norms with a soft dimension; #3 soft law combines #1 and #2.  
 
Table 1: Three ways of understanding Soft Law 
 
#1: Non-binding norms with legal relevance 
Norms 
Binding norms Non-binding norms 
Binding norms Non-binding norms 
with legal relevance 
Non-binding norms 
without any legal 
relevance 
Hard law Soft law Non legal norms 
 
#2: Binding norms with a soft dimension 
Norms 
Binding Norms Non-binding norms 
Binding norms Binding norms with 
a soft dimension 
Non-binding norms 
Hard law Soft law Non legal norms 
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#3: Binding norms with a soft dimension + non-binding norms having legal relevance 
Norms 
Binding Norms Non-binding norms 
Binding norms Binding norms with a 
soft dimension 
Non-binding norms 
having legal 
relevance 
Non-binding norms 
without any legal 
relevance 
Hard law Soft law Non legal norms 
 
A first way of examining soft law (#1 in Table 1) limits the definition to situations 
where no legal commitment is involved.12 This is what is done, at least implicitly, by a first 
group of scholars who associate soft law with non-treaty agreements.13 This approach is not 
satisfying for two main reasons. First, treaties sometimes contain provisions that are not 
binding and/or are not subject to legal control, and therefore cannot be considered hard law. 
Secondly, hard law is not limited to treaty agreements but also encompasses international 
organizations’ unilateral decisions as well as judicial rulings. A second group of scholars 
define soft law as « international norms that are deliberately non-binding in character but still 
have legal relevance ».14 Soft law may not be law in the full sense of the term (hard law), but 
it is law, albeit in a rather incomplete form. ‘Having legal relevance’ means that norms: 1°) 
can be used by a Court to interpret another rule, 2°) are framed in a form that resemble hard 
law norms, or 3°) can have the same impact as a hard law norm. Based on this assumption, 
legality expands to norms that are not binding.  
A second understanding of soft law (#2 in Table 1), contrary to the first one, equals soft 
law with those legal commitments that have a soft dimension (the unspecific provisions of a 
treaty, general objectives, commitments that are only optional…). No norm can be named law 
if it is not of a binding nature. Those norms that do not embody a legal obligation but are 
shaped in a way that is close to legally binding norms are kept outside the category of soft 
law. Legal positivists would characterize them as merely political norms.  
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 R. L. Williamson Jr., ‘Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses’, 
(2003) 4 Chicago Journal of International Law 1: 59–82. 
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A third way to look at soft law (#3 in Table 1) is to combine #1 and #2, and consider 
that soft law can cover both legally binding and non-legally binding norms. This paper is 
based on this understanding of soft law. On the one hand, the fact that norms have ‘legal 
relevance’ is sufficient to place them on the ‘legal’ side of the norms continuum, in spite of 
their non-binding character.  On the other hand, legal commitments do not necessarily reach 
the level of legality that is required to be seen as hard law. This duality in the definition of 
soft law, sometimes seen as a problem,15 is considered in this paper as an advantage in that it 
helps describe with precision the different ways of adopting and enforcing norms in the 
European Union. The first and second definitions oversimplify the current situation by 
placing soft law on one side of a dichotomy: either it is equalled to non-legal norms (#1) or it 
is presented as proper law (#2). Rejecting this alternative, the third definition is based on the 
assumption that EU norms can be described more accurately, and more soundly analysed, by 
using a definition of soft comprising both legally binding and non-legally binding norms. 
Thus, in order to establish soft law as an autonomous category of norms, we must clarify how 
soft law differentiates from both non-legal norms and hard law.  
 
B. The Emergence of Soft Law as an Autonomous Category of Norms 
 
1. The Distinction between Soft and Hard Law 
The soft law/hard law divide has drawn considerable interest among scholars since the 
1990s.16 In a special issue of International Organization dedicated to legalization,17 Abbott, 
Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter and Snidal characterize legal norms as having three 
components: obligation, precision and delegation.18 Obligation means that the norm contains 
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 K. Raustiala, ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’, (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 3: 581-
614.   
16
 The notion of soft law is much older. The paternity of the concept is often attributed to Lord Mc Nair, even though he did 
not use explicitily the expression ‘soft law’.  See for example: R. J. Dupuy, ‘Declaratory Law and Programmatory Law: From 
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Peace, (Sijthoff, 1977).  
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 On legalization, see also: J. Goldstein, M. Kahler, R. O. Keohane and A. M. Slaughter (eds), Legalization and World 
Politics (MIT Press, 2001); J. Goldstein, M. Kahler, R. O. Keohane and A. M. Slaughter, ‘Introduction: Legalization and 
World Politics’, (2001) 55 International Organization 3: 385-399; L. Bélanger and K. Fontaine-Skronski, ‘Legalization in 
International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis’, (2012) 51 Social Science Information sur les sciences sociales, 2: 238-262. 
On ‘juridification’, see: L. C. Blichner and A. Molander, ‘Mapping Juridification’, (2008) 14 European Law Journal 1: 36-
54.  
18
 K. W. Abbott, R. O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A.-M. Slaughter and D. Snidal, ‘The Concept of Legalization’, (2000) 54 
International Organization, 3:401-419. See also in the same issue: K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in 
International Governance’, (2000) 54 International Organization 3: 421-456. 
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an injunction to act in a specific manner, or to restrain from acting in a specific manner. 
Precision refers to the content of the obligation, high precision meaning that rules 
unambiguously describe the conduct they require, authorize or proscribe. Finally, delegation 
alludes to the granting of authority to third parties in order to implement, interpret and apply 
rules, and to resolve disputes. According to Abbott and al., if only one of these components is 
missing, the norm might be a legal one but cannot be considered as hard law. Their reasoning 
is based on the idea that soft law does not combine the different elements that usually define 
hard law. 
The criteria I use to distinguish soft law from hard law draws on Abbott and al’s, with 
two differences: I do not use precision as a distinctive criterion and opt for enforcement 
instead of delegation. Thus, I assume that the distinction between hard and soft law depends 
not only on the existence of an obligation but also on the way the obligation is enforced. This 
does not mean that precision has no relevance, but that it is a quality that helps to determine 
the existence and intensity of an obligation. Thus precision can be worthy but only as a 
secondary feature closely tied with –or integrated into- the obligation criterion. Enforcement 
takes precedence over delegation because the former puts the emphasis on the whole range of 
mechanisms that can be used to ensure that actors fulfil obligations or achieve the assigned 
goals (delegation to a third party but also procedures and instruments such as guidelines, 
standards, instructions) whereas the latter seems very much focused on the authorities 
designed to implement agreements but also on the instruments that are used to ensure 
compliance.  Enforcement goes from monitoring to more coercive mechanisms including 
judicial control and sanctions.  
 
Two cumulative elements give birth to an obligation: its source and its content. The 
softness of the obligation derives -alternatively or cumulatively- from the softness of the 
source (soft instrumentum) and the softness of what the instrument provides for, i.e. its 
content (soft negotium).19 Conversely, an obligation is hard when both the source and the 
content are hard.  
When rules are enshrined in a source other than a formal treaty or a binding unilateral 
act, or when they have not been legalized by a jurisdiction, there is a presumption that these 
rules do not create clear legal obligations. But sources such as treaties, binding unilateral acts, 
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 J. D’Aspremont, op. cit., 1081, note 11 supra. 
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customary law or judicial decisions, which clearly seem to be legal, may also contain soft law 
norms in those cases when the norms are imprecise. Either the rule is clear and leaves no 
room for manoeuver, or it is vague and offers a variety of possible interpretations.  The 
assumption, here is that norms, which are worked out in detail, give birth to stronger 
obligations than loose, ill-defined, imprecise norms. In the same vein, we can say that the 
obligation to achieve a particular result is stronger than a best effort obligation, or that a norm 
containing a principle is less mandatory than a norm containing a right.  
 
Though the source and content of a norm help us distinguish between hard and soft 
obligations, the hard and soft law divide also depends on the way the obligation is enforced. 
Here, I will discriminate between hard enforcement, soft enforcement and the absence of any 
enforcement mechanism. Hard enforcement relates to those situations where rules are 
submitted to judicial control or to a very constraining form of non-judicial control (in the case 
of an international organization this would materialize in a binding decision taken by a 
supranational institution). The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a good case-in-point, with 
its implementation, monitoring and dispute settlement mechanisms.  
Soft enforcement is about procedures aimed at ensuring compliance without necessarily 
resorting to coercion or constraint. This is the case for the bulk of international treaties, where 
parties are not obliged to submit disputes to the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice or any other Court. Treaties such as human rights agreements are implemented by the 
parties under the ‘soft’ surveillance and monitoring of bodies such as the human rights 
committee and other specialized committees. Finally, the absence of enforcement mechanism 
refers to situations where compliance only depends on the actors’ political will. This was the 
case for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, before it was transformed into the 
WTO.20  
 
These two criteria -obligation and enforcement- allow us to construct soft law as an 
autonomous category of norms. Indeed, norms are considered soft in opposition to hard law 
when at least one of the two elements is not hard. If none of the two elements is present, in 
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 F. M. Abbott, ‘The Intersection of Law and Trade in the WTO System: Economics and the Transition to a Hard Law 
System’, in D. Orden and D. Roberts (eds), Understanding Technical Barriers to Agricultural Trade (Minn.: International 
Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, 1997) at 33.  
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other words if there is no obligation and no enforcement at all, the norm does not resort to soft 
law but is mere politics. Does this approach contradict Kelsen’s definition of law as a specific 
social technique consisting in ‘the establishment of a coercive order by means of which a 
community monopoly is constituted for applying the measures of coercion decreed by the 
order’?21 I would rather say that it takes this definition as an ideal-type, which suffers from 
two kinds of limitations: first, when the obligation is not clearly established; second, when 
measures of coercion aiming at ensuring compliance with law are lacking/limited. Kelsen 
himself, while arguing in favour of a clear legal order backed up with efficient coercion 
means, took into account situations that did not fit with the ideal-type, especially when he 
depicted international public law as ‘primitive law’.22  
 
2. The distinction between Soft law and Non legal norms 
Soft law can be distinguished from non-legal norms23 by using the same criteria that 
help to draw a line between soft and hard law. For a norm to be considered as soft law, there 
must be some kind of obligation and/or enforcement mechanism.  
As regards obligation, the source and content of the norm help separate soft law from 
non-legal norms such as religious rules or morality. Soft law norms often look like hard law 
norms. They are quasi-legal because they have been given a form that clearly resembles hard 
law. They are ‘law-like promises or statements that fall short of hard law’.24 For instance, a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) such as the 1972 MoU between the USA and the 
USSR relating to the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, may create grounds for a legal obligation, 
but cannot be assimilated to a formal treaty. The content of the norm shall also ‘interpret or 
inform our understanding of legally binding rules or represent promises that in turn create 
expectations about future conduct’.25 In other words soft norms have two different functions 
that separate them from non-legal ones: they complement hard law by giving interpretations 
or additional information, and exert influence on actors -as hard norms do- but without 
resorting to judicial coercion. The abovementioned MoU between the USA and the USSR, 
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 H. Kelsen, ‘The Law as a Specific Social Technique’, (1941) 9 The University of Chicago Law Review 1: 75-97. 
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 Ibid. 97. 
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 For an approach questioning the distinction between legal and non-legal norms: M. Finnemore, ‘Are Legal Norms 
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25
 This definition is very helpful in that it gives criteria for distinguishing soft law and politics. But contrary to Abbott and al. 
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which updated the ABM treaty, gives a good example of an act fulfilling the interpretative 
function. As for the second function, there are plenty of documents providing guidelines in 
order to shape states’ behaviour, and ‘binding their participants in a common cognitive 
framework, one that did not require coercion’.26 A good example is given by the declaration 
on the rights of the indigenous people, which has been studied though the lenses of the soft 
law approach.27  
When the source is quasi-legal, there is a strong probability that an enforcement 
mechanism is provided, through procedures, information diffusion, bureaucratic operations, 
delegation of authorities to enforce and implement rules. For example, within the 
International Labour Organization,28 recommendations as well as conventions are supervised 
by a Committee of experts and a Tripartite Committee. But there is no judicial review that 
could lead to financial or other kinds of sanctions. The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) gives examples of similar practices,29 as does the 
Basle agreement.30  
There is no other way to define non-legal norms than negatively, as norms which cannot 
be considered as soft law. Thus, when there is no attempt at formalizing a norm in a way that 
resembles legal norms, and when a norm does not fulfil the abovementioned functions 
(interpreting a norm and exerting influence on actors through organisational mechanisms), 
this means that the requirements for soft law are not met. The main challenge is to apply these 
criteria in a consistent and indisputable way. This should not prevent us from trying, because 
the costs of denying the existence of soft law is higher than the benefits of mistaking social 
norms for legal norms. When looking at the different forms of ‘juridification’, Blichner and 
Molander emphasize the process whereby norms becoming legal, making clear that, instead of 
a black and white divide between legal and non legal norms, sometimes norms are 
progressively ‘juridicized’.31 If we only consider those norms that can with no doubt be taken 
as hard law, we miss the opportunity to analyse the whole spectrum of legal normativity. And 
we still face a delimitation problem between law and non-legal norms. By drawing a clear line 
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 M. Dawson, op. cit., 6, note 6 supra. 
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 M. Barelli, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: the Case the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, (2009) 58 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 4: 957–983. 
28
 I. Duplessis, ‘Les vertiges de la soft law: Réactions internationales en droit international’, (2007), Revue québécoise de 
droit international, Hors série: 245-268. 
29
 M. Marcussen, ‘Multilateral Surveillance and the OECD. Playing the idea game’, in K. Armingeon and M. Beyeler (eds), 
OECD Surveillance and Welfare State in Western Europe (Edward Elgar, 2003). 
30
 D. E. Ho, ‘Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?’, (2002) 5 Journal of 
International Economic Law 3: 647-688. 
31
 L. C. Blichner and A. Molander, op. cit. 
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between hard law and non-legal norms, we face as many problems (what about customary 
rules, for example?) as placing norms on a continuum made of non legal norms, soft law and 
hard law.   
 
C. A typology of Soft and Hard Law 
The combination of the two criteria –obligation and enforcement- leads to the following 
typology (see Table 2). Hard law corresponds to the situation where hard obligation and hard 
enforcement are connected (as with the trade rules at the WTO). 32 Non legal norms follow 
from those situations where no legal obligation and no enforcement mechanism can be 
identified (e.g. a declaration made by heads of government on an international issue). In 
between these two opposite types of norms lie different forms of soft law, combining hard 
obligation/soft enforcement (a precise treaty-based rule combined with an arbitration or 
optional dispute settlement), hard obligation/no enforcement (a unilateral act adopted by an 
international institution, without control of any kind), soft obligation/hard enforcement (an 
imprecise treaty-base rule with a coercive mechanism of enforcement), soft obligation/soft 
enforcement (an imprecise treaty-based rule with an optional dispute settlement such as the 
ICJ), soft obligation/no enforcement (a practice being transformed into a custom). As we can 
see in Table 2, soft law does not necessarily lacks coercive enforcement, but when a strong 
enforcement mechanism has been set up in combination with soft obligation, soft law comes 
very close to hard law. Soft law does not necessarily imply the use of an enforcement 
mechanism. But if there is no such mechanism, there must be some kind of obligation at least. 
As regards obligation, soft law covers a wide range of situations, from non-binding rules to 
strong commitments. But non-binding rules, to be considered soft law, must contain some 
incentives to act in a specific way, ie. some kind or enforcement mechanism.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
32
 WTO law can still be characterized as hard in spite of Footer’s (2010) argument that soft law has been reintroduced into 
the World Trade Organization. M. E. Footer, ‘The (Re)turn to “Soft Law” in Reconciling the Antinomies in WTO Law’, 
(2010) 11 Melbourne Journal of International Law 2: 241–276. 
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Table 2: Criteria for Defining Soft and Hard Law 
Type of norm Nature of the obligation Nature of the enforcement 
mechanism 
Hard Law Hard Obligation Hard Enforcement 
Soft Enforcement Hard Obligation 
No Enforcement 
Soft Obligation Hard Enforcement 
Soft Enforcement  
No Enforcement 
Soft Law 
No Obligation Soft Enforcement 
Non Legal Norm No Obligation No Enforcement 
 
Before applying this typology to the case of the European Union, an important objection 
must be examined. To some extent, as briefly mentioned in the section dealing with the soft 
and hard law distinction, it can be argued that soft law is not proper law because it does not 
contribute efficiently to social integration. More precisely, soft law would endanger the rule 
of law insofar as it does not fit with Kelsen and Bodenheimer’s definition of law as producing 
highly certain normative knowledge complemented by institutionalised coercion. 33  The 
softness of the norms would be detrimental to the citizens, because it leads to massive 
discretion on the side of those who are in charge of implementing the norms. The question 
whether law is still law when it does not satisfy the highest criteria of social democracy is of 
major importance from the standpoint of the theory of law, and for everyone interested in 
                                                             
33
 See H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2009); E. Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy 
and Method of Law, (Universal Law Publishing Co Ltd, 2005). 
 15 
democracy. In this paper, however, I do not look at the way law contributes to social 
integration. Although I acknowledge that law is ‘a specific social technique”,34 a specific way 
of strengthening social integration, the respective merits of EU soft and hard law to perform 
this function is not evaluated here. The objective is to categorize norms within the soft/hard 
law continuum, in order to cast some light on the transformation of EU norms over time.  
My assumption is that the mere fact that a legal norm badly performs its function of 
social integration does not preclude us from calling it law. Since a norm has been adopted and 
meets the criteria of obligation and enforcement, somehow it must be placed on the law 
continuum. The European Union is seen as an organization based on a legal order, with a high 
level of compliance with law. ‘Integration through law’ has played an important role in the 
integration process and resistance to European law has never reached the point where the 
existence of EU law would be jeopardized. But EU law, instead of being a monolithic bloc of 
norms, is composed of different types of norms, most of them being hard law, but some of 
them being soft law. 
This is not say that European integration does not raise any question of democracy and 
legitimacy. On the contrary, the evolution of EU law may have a role in the on-going debate 
on the democratic deficit. Soft law, by reducing certainty in the production and 
implementation of norms, and putting aside the Parliament and the ECJ, may add something 
to the legitimacy problem. But, on the other hand, it can be argued that soft law is helping to 
reduce the democratic deficit by the emphasis it puts on deliberation and participation of the 
social partners. Yet, I do not enter into the debate on the contribution that soft law brings to 
democracy because: first, it does not disqualify soft law from being law; second, it does not 
help me to identify soft law in the EU; third, it does not help to check whether processes of 
soft law hardening and hard law softening have taken place in the EU.   
 
III. Identifying soft law in the European Union 
 
This second section aims at providing a mapping of EU law based on the distinction 
between soft law and hard law, and using the criteria and typology developed in the first 
section. In the existing literature, there is no overview of EU law that would clearly identify 
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those two categories of norms and specify what kind of soft law derives from European 
integration.35 This article tries to fill the gap. Hard law can be found in most of the policies 
functioning under the Community method, including the single market, competition, 
monetary union, environmental, agricultural, regional and social policy. EU soft law is widely 
used in those policies that are not supranational, but it is also possible, although less frequent, 
within the Community method. Different kinds of soft law can be identified within the EU, 
reflecting the different types of obligation/enforcement combination previously exposed (see 
Table 2).  
 
A. Hard obligation / soft enforcement 
Economic governance and fiscal policy offer an interesting case of a combination of 
hard obligation and soft enforcement. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP),36 which is based 
on two treaty articles (art. 121 and 126 TFEU) and outlined by Council regulations, is made 
of a preventive arm and a corrective arm. It was adopted in 1997, and reformed several times, 
in 2005, 2011 (the six-pack reform) and 2013 (the two-pack reform and the fiscal compact). 
 As far as the preventive arm is concerned, Member States outline medium-term 
budgetary plans in stability and convergence programmes, which are submitted and assessed 
annually in the context of multilateral fiscal surveillance under the European Semester. The 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) constitutes the dissuasive part of the SGP. Under the Pact, 
the national annual budget deficit should not be higher than 3% of GDP and the government 
debt should be limited to 60% of GDP (or at least diminish sufficiently towards the 60%). 
When the deficit and debt are considered excessive, the Council can issue recommendations 
to the member state concerned, which is supposed to make the necessary corrections in a 
limited time frame. Non-compliance with these preventive as well as corrective requirements 
can lead to the imposition of sanctions for euro area countries. The fiscal compact contained 
within the inter-governmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) signed 
in March 2012 and entered into force on 1st January 2013, adds another requirement. The 
Member States must enshrine in national law a balanced budget rule with a lower limit of a 
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structural deficit of 0.5% GDP (the so-called golden rule), centered on the concept of the 
country-specific medium-term objective as defined in the SGP.  
At first sight, the source and content of the norms seem to indicate that the obligation is 
hard. The source is EU law having primacy over national law and the content is formulated in 
a way that confirms the compulsory character of the objectives. But the obligation is softened 
by two limitations contained in art. 126 TFEU. Concerning the government deficit, the ratio 
can exceed 3% of the GDP in two cases: when « the ratio has declined substantially and 
continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference value », or, alternatively, 
when « the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio 
remains close to the reference value ». Concerning the government debt, an exception can be 
made if « the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a 
satisfactory pace ». The extent to which these limitations have softened the obligation is 
debatable.37 Generally speaking, the debt and deficit requirements, as well as the golden rule 
introduced by the TSCG, are rather imprecise obligations. Giving a legal definition to a 
‘structural deficit of 0,5% GDP’, as the TSCG requires, proves to be very difficult. There is 
no consensus on what a structural deficit can be. Nevertheless, I assume that the obligations 
contained in the SGP and the TSCG remain hard because the rules, ambiguous as they may 
be, can be rendered more precise by the interpretations offered by the Commission and the 
Council. Thus, it shall be called (soft) hard obligations. 
Besides, the (not so) hard obligations contained in article 126 TFEU, the SGP and the 
TSCG are enforced by a rather weak mechanism relying upon the Member States willingness 
to make it effective. In the early 1990s, the EDP has not proved efficient on the deficit 
objective. In particular, it has shown its limits when the Council did not sanction France and 
Germany for violating rules on debt and public deficits in 2002-03. Since then, many breaches 
of the EDP have not been sanctioned. As Hodson and Maher wrote, ‘declarations of breach of 
obligation depend on the behaviour of peers for their effectiveness. If peers are unconcerned 
about breach, for example because they wish to be treated leniently if and when they are in 
breach, then the sanction is rendered useless. In short, where political ownership of the 
arrangement is absent, its very existence can be called into question’.38 With the adoption of 
both the six-pack reform (2011) and the TSCG (2013), the enforcement mechanism has been 
strengthened. In particular, the six-pack reform and the TSCG have introduced a new rule, 
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which allows the Council to decide sanctions on the basis of a reversed qualify majority (the 
sanctions are adopted unless a qualified majority rejects the decision). Financial sanctions are 
now possible of Euro area Member States. Nevertheless, I argue that it is still soft 
enforcement, as it remains implemented by the Council, instead of a supranational institution 
such as the Commission or the ECJ. But it is, undoubtedly, a rather hard type of soft 
enforcement. 
A similar case of hard obligation/soft enforcement can be found in the Economic 
Adjustment Programmes imposed to these Member States seeking financial support in the 
context of the financial and economic crisis. Although enshrined in Memoranda of 
Understanding, the obligations are rather precise and do not give much room of manoeuver to 
the Member States concerned. The European Commission, the ECB and the IMF monitor 
compliance with the terms and conditions of the Programme, before the Eurogroup and the 
IMF's Executive Board approve the release of each disbursement. 
 
B.  Hard Obligation / No enforcement  
The second combination –hard obligation without any sort of enforcement mechanism- 
describes the situation in the CFSP as well as in the third pillar ‘justice and home affairs’.  
The common actions and positions adopted within the framework of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are meant to be legally binding acts, even though the ECJ 
is not entrusted with controlling them.39 The wording of the EU treaty makes it clear that 
common actions and common positions are legally binding, in spite of a total lack of 
enforcement. Decisions of the Council that require operational action in the field of CFSP 
‘shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their 
activity » (art. 28 TEU). Regarding those decisions defining the approach of the Union to a 
particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature, « Member States shall ensure that their 
national policies conform to the Union positions » (art. 29). But the role of the Commission as 
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the guardian of EU law does not extend to CFSP and the ECJ has no jurisdiction over CFSP.40 
There is no enforcement mechanism that would help ensure compliance with CFSP decisions.  
The second case of hard obligation / no enforcement combination is justice and home 
affairs, 41  the so-called third pillar of the European Union. The third pillar has been 
communautarized in two steps: part of JHA (asylum, immigration, border controls and civil 
law cooperation) has been placed under the control of the Court of the justice after the entry 
into force of the Amsterdam treaty, and a similar extension has been decided for the 
remaining part of JHA (police and judicial cooperation in the field of criminal law) in the 
aftermath of the Lisbon treaty.  Hence, the hard obligation / no enforcement combination 
describes a past situation which applied to the ‘large’ third pillar between 1993 and 1999, and 
the ‘reduced’ one between 1999 and 2009. During these periods, the Council adopted 
framework decisions that were binding but could not be subjected to judicial review.  
 
C.  Soft Obligation or No Obligation / Soft Enforcement  
It seems that there is no situation where soft obligations are not backed up with any sort 
of enforcement mechanism. When Member States define a minimum level of obligation, they 
usually supplement them with soft implementation procedures. Yet, a combination of ‘no 
obligation’ with soft enforcement is possible. In CFSP, declarations and strategic documents, 
although non-legal, often contain goals whose compliance is sustained by institutional means. 
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) also seems to be very close to this combination, 
since the objectives are not compulsory. Programmes, general guidelines and objectives 
cannot be any more than weak forms of obligations. Member states commit themselves to 
engaging in a coordination mechanism, not to achieving specific objectives. Norms developed 
in this way are not directly applicable or transposable into domestic law. The national 
authorities only agree to take them into account when forming their own policies. The idea 
that the OMC includes some forms of obligation is far from being consensual. To some 
extent, there is an obligation of means, which may justify a qualification as soft obligation.  
But, whatever the nature of the obligation may be (soft or non-existent), it is still possible to 
characterize the OMC as soft law, due to the existence of soft enforcement mechanisms 
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composed of procedures and monitoring instruments. The OMC is not subject to review by 
the European Court of Justice, but it is organised with a view to reducing the Member States’ 
room for manoeuver thanks to an ensemble of four procedural elements: 1) guidelines and 
timetables for achieving the goals; 2) quantitative and qualitative indicators, as well as 
benchmarks helping to identify best practices; 3) targets and measurements specific to each 
country, and aimed at translating these guidelines into national and regional programmes; 4) 
periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as mutual learning processes.42 
Under the OMC, central authorities such as the Commission and the Council can issue 
recommendations but they are not in a position to call states to account. Accountability is 
horizontal more than vertical, meaning that the Member States are forced to take seriously, 
and to answer for, the preferences, objections and counter-proposals of other governments.43 
However, the characterisation of the method as entirely heterarchical is often misleading. In a 
way, hierarchy has been reintroduced: the influence of the ‘center’ has returned, although at a 
more abstract and procedural level, when we look at political discourse through which 
reforms are evaluated, national reforms that are conducted, institutions –peer review, 
committees…- in which interdependencies between Member States can be managed.44  
A huge literature has analysed the different forms of coordination existing in the 
European Union. Some of them focus on soft law, others study the ways and means of the 
OMC more generally, while including at least a reference to the softness of the rules adopted 
in this context. These general studies have tried to explain the search for soft alternatives in 
the European Union,45 specify the functions of the OMC,46 and evaluate its effectiveness in 
dealing with sensitive issues.47 Regarding the impact of the OMC on EU governance, some 
studies situate soft law and the OMC with regards to the rise of flexibility in the European 
Union, 48  make clear the differences between the OMC and the classic and hierarchical 
Community method, 49  while others see it as a new form of supranationalism. 50  The 
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democratic nature of the OMC is discussed,51  some scholars arguing that the OMC has 
introduced more democratic parameters into the decision-making,52 others replying that it is 
less democratic due to the lack of parliamentary control. Everybody agrees that coordination 
brings something new,53 although it was not totally unknown in the first decades of European 
integration.   
Three policy areas have been specifically studied, individually or in combination.54  
The coordination of national economic policies55 has been treaty-based since the early 
1990s and the adoption of the Maastricht treaty. The Council defines policy objectives for the 
European Union as well as specific recommendations for each member state in the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG). Neither the objectives nor the guidelines are binding 
commitments. The Member States generate programmes that are meant to fulfil the objectives 
in accordance with the BEPG. A soft enforcement mechanism is provided, through 
surveillance monitored by the Council and Commission. Other forms of economic 
surveillance have been developed in response to the financial and economic crisis. The 
European Semester is a cycle of EU economic policy guidance, allowing for a surveillance of 
each country by the Commission. The Commission assesses national economic reports and 
proposes recommendations which are then discussed by the European Council and adopted by 
the Council. The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) is a surveillance mechanism 
aiming at identifying risks of macroeconomic imbalances, preventing and correcting it. A set of 
indicators is used to identify countries and issues that need a closer examination (in-depth 
review). Just like the SGP, the MIP has a preventive and a corrective arm. Sanctions are possible 
under the Excessive Imbalance Procedure for euro area Member States that repeatedly fail to 
meet their obligations. In spite of the similarity with the SGP, the MIP incorporates softer 
obligations, due to a higher degree of imprecision of the norms enclosed in the MIP documents. 
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This is why the MIP is classified as soft obligation / soft enforcement, while the SGP is a case of 
hard obligation / soft enforcement.  
The second policy area -employment policy- has been developed since the Amsterdam 
treaty on the policy model of economic convergence, with guidelines issued by the 
Commission and agreed upon by the Council. These guidelines are not legally binding but the 
Member States are expected to take them into account in their national policies. The 
implementation of the guidelines is supervised by the Council, on the basis of a report 
approved by an Employment Committee composed of two officials from each member state 
and two officials from the Commission, and working alongside the social partners. The 
Committee is the place where the Member States review each other’s performance. The 
model was inspired by the recommendation procedure and peer review of the OECD.56 The 
legal dimension of this coordination process derives from the procedures that can be 
considered as soft enforcement.  
The third area is social policy. Before the Maastricht treaty, social policy was not a clear 
competence of the European Community, as very few articles of the treaty set out the 
conditions for social action. Secondary law adopted in this field was closely related to the 
internal market and was viewed through an economic lens. The social protocol annexed to the 
Maastricht treaty has expanded EU competence while giving the opportunity for independent 
social legislation. From the 2000 Lisbon summit onwards, the OMC has been the favoured 
way of developing a social policy in the fields of social inclusion and pension reform more 
particularly.57  
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D. Soft Law Getting Closer to Hard Law (Soft Obligation/Hard Enforcement – Soft 
Law Combined with Hard Law) 
In the European Union, it is not so easy to differentiate soft law from hard law. Two 
different situations are noteworthy.  
The first situation appears when soft obligation is combined with hard obligation. In 
those fields where the Community method and hard law apply, there is still room for soft law. 
Hard instruments can have a soft content or, to say it differently, what looks like hard law at 
first sight can actually turn out to be soft obligation (in combination with hard enforcement). 
Some directives (or some parts of directives) are worded in a vague and non-normative way, 
contain unspecified or loose obligations, showing that a hard instrumentum does not 
necessarily entail a hard obligation. This is the case for those directives dealing with social 
standards58 and applying to pregnant workers, young workers, working time or employment 
contract information. Another example could fit with this situation of soft obligation/hard 
enforcement if we consider -contrary to what I did in point A- fiscal rules as soft obligations. 
With the hardening of the enforcement mechanism since the 2011-2013 reform (see section 
IV, B, 2), we could then be facing another form of soft obligation/hard enforcement 
combination.  
The second kind of soft law/hard law ambiguity is related to policy areas generating soft 
law in addition to hard law. In competition policy, for instance, soft law has emerged 
progressively under the influence of the European Commission. The Commission has 
established general criteria for state aid, which is still deemed admissible.59 Formally, this soft 
law binds only the Commission itself – in practice, however, it defines positive criteria for 
national state aid policies compatible with the common market and leaves little room for 
Member States aid policies, which deviate from these criteria.60 
Justice and home affairs offer another example of soft law complementing hard law. 
The communautarization of the third pillar, after the Amsterdam and the Lisbon treaties, did 
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not end up removing soft law from the JHA field. On the contrary, there is evidence showing 
that non-binding instruments continue to play a role.61 Soft law in JHA consists of two main 
categories of instruments. The first one is composed of recommendations, conclusions, 
resolutions, guidelines, that set up targets to be reached by the Member States in specific 
areas (for example the Council Resolution of 4 December 2006 on Handbook 
recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control 
violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international 
dimension). They often resemble legislative texts in the density and nature of their provisions. 
The second one consists of programme target-setting and comprises action plans, programmes 
and strategies which plan the adoption of common measures by the Member States (for 
example: the Tampere programme in 1999, the Hague programme in 2004, the Stockholm 
programme in 2009).  
Other policy areas that seem at first sight to be covered by hard law and the Community 
method, in reality provide a large amount of soft law instruments. This is the case with the 
environment, 62  energy, 63  business taxation, 64  the research and technology development 
policy,65 the information society policy, or the role of the ombudsman.66 In a way, these 
policy areas resemble the OMC. Yet, they do not include the full governance architecture 
defined during the Lisbon summit in 2000, but only fragmentary elements, such as European 
Action Plans, objectives, targets, scoreboards, indicators, peer review, or exchange of good 
practices.67  
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Table 3: An Overview of Soft and Hard norms in the EU 
Type of norm Type of obligation / enforcement Relevance in EU law and public policies 
Hard Law  Hard Obligation / Hard Enforcement Most of the policies under the Community 
method: Internal Market, Trade, Agriculture, 
Fisheries, Competition, Transport, Regional 
Policy, R&D, Environment, Monetary Union, 
Consumers, Development, Social Policy, 
Industry, JHA-AFSJ (since Amsterdam).  
Charter of fundamental rights (since Lisbon) 
Some aspects of fiscal and macro-economic 
surveillance (since the 2011-2013 reforms) 
Hard Obligation / Soft Enforcement Fiscal and macro-economic surveillance (at 
least before the 2011-2013 reforms) 
Hard Obligation / No Enforcement 
Some aspects of CFSP: common positions 
and joint actions 
Soft Obligation / Hard Enforcement 
Some aspects of fiscal and macro-economic 
surveillance (since the 2011-2013 reforms) 
Soft Obligation / Soft Enforcement Open method of coordination: Employment, 
Social inclusion and pensions, Economic 
coordination 
Some aspects of: Competition, Transport, 
Regional Policy, Environment, Consumers, 
Development, Industry, R&D, Education and 
culture, JHA-AFSJ, Energy 
Soft Obligation / No Enforcement  
Soft Law 
No Obligation / Soft Enforcement (OMC and other kinds of coordination: see 
above) 
Some aspects of CFSP: declarations and 
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 strategic documents 
Non Legal Norm No Obligation / No Enforcement Declarations issued by EU institutions or 
individual members of EU institutions (ex: 
statements made by the High Representative 
on its own initiative – resolutions of the 
European Parliament) 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. The Creation and the Evolution of Law in the European Union 
 
The methodology used in this third section is mainly based on secondary literature 
dealing with law and governance in the different policy areas covered by the European Union. 
I use these publications in order to categorize competences and public policies, and see how 
they fit with the distinction between two kinds of processes: legalization and delegalization. 
Legalization concerns the transformation of non-legal norms into soft law (limited 
legalization) or hard law (complete legalization), as well as the hardening of soft law (soft law 
becoming hard law); Delegalization includes the softening of hard law norms (limited 
delegalization) as well as evolutions from soft/hard law to non-legal norms (complete 
delegalization) (see Table 4).  
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Table 4: Legalization and Delegalization Processes 
Legalization Delegalization 
Limited 
Legalization 
Complete 
Legalization 
Limited 
Delegalization 
Complete 
Delegalization 
NLN ⇔ Legal 
Norms (soft and 
hard) 
NLN  SL 
 
NLN   HL 
 
SL  NLN 
 
HL  NLN 
 
SL ⇔ HL SL  HL  
(SL Hardening) 
 HL  SL  
(HL Softening) 
 
NLN: Non-Legal Norms     LN: Legal Norms    SL: Soft Law     HL: Hard Law 
 
These processes of legalization and delegalization will be studied in two steps. The first 
section will look at the creation of norms, and check whether they are created in the form of 
soft or hard law.  The second section will analyse the evolution of legal norms, once created, 
and check whether they can move from one category (hard law – soft law – non legal norms) 
to another. To do so, I will primarily look at the treaties insofar as they provide legal 
grounding for the EU public policies. Additionally, I will take into account the fact that some 
of these policies were launched before being enshrined in the European treaties.  
 
 
 
A. The Creation of Norms: from Complete to Limited Legalization 
Legalization is a process whereby states set up legal instruments in order to shape their 
relationship and limit discretional behaviors in a specific domain of activities. While complete 
legalization was the common practice until the 1990s, since then, limited legalization has 
become prominent.  
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1. From the early 1950s to the late 1980s: Complete Legalization as the Major Trend 
 
From the 1950’s to the 1980’s, the so-called ‘Community Method’, relying upon 
supranational institutions and legal integration, was central to European integration.68 The 
political objective of integrating the Member States politics and policies were to be achieved 
through the making of hard law rules, which constituted what the European Court of Justice 
called in its landmark rulings of 1963 and 1964 a European legal order. This new legal order, 
independent from the national and international order, was composed of norms divided into 
four main categories: treaties, secondary law (regulations, directives, decisions), general 
principles of community law, and external agreements. In most cases, the competences 
conferred to the European Community were implemented through a process of complete 
legalization. This was true for the internal market, competition, the CAP, commercial policy, 
regional policy, transport, research and development, the environment as well as social issues. 
Some of these policies also included soft law as additional rules  (research and development, 
environment, social policy, and to some extent competition policy), but only one heavily 
relied upon soft law (foreign policy).  
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Table 5: Hard and Soft Law in EU Policy Areas – From the Rome Treaty to the SEA 
Type of Law Policy Area Date of Treaty 
Inclusion 
Hard Law Soft Law 
Internal Market  Rome 1957 + + + - 
Trade Rome 1957 + + + - 
Agriculture  Rome 1957 + + + - 
Competition  Rome 1957 + + + 
Transport Rome 1957 + +  + 
European Social 
Fund 
Rome 1957 + + - 
Regional Policy * Single European Act 
1986 
+ +  + 
Research and 
Development 
Technology * 
Single European Act 
1986 
+ + + 
Environment * Single European Act 
1986 
+ + + 
Foreign Policy (and 
Security)  
Single European Act 
1986 
- + + + 
 
* Secondary law was adopted into this area before the creation of a treaty-based competence 
for the policy as a whole.  
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2. From the 1990s onwards: Limited Legalization as the Major Trend 
Since the 1990’s and the Maastricht treaty, and moreover since the Lisbon Strategy for 
growth and employment in March 2000, the use of soft law has increased tremendously and 
now concerns several « new » areas of competence. Hard law remains an option that is 
sometimes considered suitable.  This is the case for monetary union, which works on a deeply 
integrated basis. This is also the case for other policy areas such as development cooperation, 
industry, consumers and culture, where the EU legislates (ie. creates hard law) but in 
combination with soft law. It can be argued, however, that the introduction of hard law in 
these fields had started before the 1990s, on the basis of secondary law regulations.  
In other policy areas, soft law governs the area because EU institutions and Member 
States have opted for soft modes of governance instead of harder ones. To say it differently, 
there is a growing tendency to make limited legalization prevail over complete legalization, 
when new policy areas are launched. Recommendations, benchmarking, best practices, peer 
review have given rise to ‘new forms of governance’, based on the desire of participants to 
agree, through collective deliberation, on procedural norms, forms of regulation and shared 
political objectives, whilst preserving a diversity of solutions and local measures. Since the 
1990s, there seems to be a growing preference for procedural frameworks over substantive 
prescriptions.69 It can be argued that these soft modes of governance differ from old soft law 
procedures and concepts. New soft law is intergovernmental oriented (while old soft law was 
supranational oriented), kept away from the Parliament and the Court, managed at political 
and not only at administrative level, based on the participation of a wide range of actors, 
public as well as private.70  
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Table 6: Hard and Soft Law in EU Policy Areas – From Maastricht to Lisbon Treaty 
Type of Law Policy Area Date of Treaty 
Inclusion 
Hard Law Soft Law 
Monetary Union * Treaty of Maastricht + + + - 
Consumers Treaty of Maastricht + +  + 
Development Policy 
* 
Treaty of Maastricht + + + 
Social Policy71 * Treaty of Maastricht +  + + 
Industry * Treaty of Maastricht  +  + + 
Education and 
Culture * 
Treaty of Maastricht +  + + 
Fiscal governance Treaty of Maastricht + + + 
Economic  
Coordination and 
surveillance 
Treaty of Maastricht - + + + 
JHA – AFSJ  Treaty of Maastricht - + + + 
 Treaty of Amsterdam 
and Lisbon 
+ + + 
Employment * Treaty of Amsterdam + + + 
Energy * Treaty of Lisbon + + + 
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* Secondary law was adopted in this area before the creation of a treaty-based competence 
for the policy as a whole.  
 
What are the main reasons explaining this evolution? Why do states use soft law instead 
of hard law? In the literature dealing with soft law in international relations,72 three kinds of 
reasons have been put forward, the second and third reasons being alternatives. First, soft law 
agreements are easier to conclude and imply lower bureaucratic transaction costs than hard 
law. Secondly, soft law rules are chosen when little is at stake: the objective is easy to 
achieve; states are relatively certain that they will not deviate from the promised behavior in 
the future, due to the limited importance of the subject matter. In those cases, there is no need 
to invest resources in a binding agreement. Thirdly, and in opposition with the second point, 
soft law is favored when states have considerable interests that they do not want to put at risk. 
They are aware that soft law will have less of an impact than hard law,73 and that hard law 
implies concessions and jeopardizes sovereignty. They refuse to be constrained or to pay the 
costs of violating hard law rules, be it sanctions, retaliation or reputation costs. Fourth, soft 
law is not used to pursue materialistic interest but rather as a means to simulate progress.  
It seems that the rationale behind creating soft rules within the European Union74 is 
linked with the first and third points. First, the flexible nature of soft law in terms of rule-
making and implementation may partly explain the use of soft law within the EU. Reforming 
the treaties is not an easy task and becomes more and more difficult as the European Union 
expands. The accession of new members also put a strain on the legislative process. Soft 
governance, on the contrary, is less demanding as the Member States do not have to agree 
upon binding rules through difficult and lengthy procedures.  Secondly, the Member States 
want to further EU integration in sensitive fields, while avoiding a loss of sovereignty at a 
time when the citizens’ support for European integration is called into question. The 
paradoxical fact that non-legally binding instruments such as new EU modes of soft 
governance may have an impact defies the common wisdom that only legally binding 
instruments have a strong political influence. This is how the Commission, in particular, 
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justified their use,75 echoing an academic literature that emphasized the possible effects of 
non binding norms.76 
 
B. The Evolution of Law: the Softening and Hardening of European Law 
 
It is very unlikely that EU soft law would trigger a complete delegalization of hard law 
norms. Within the European Union, the Member States have to maintain the Community 
acquis composed of all the EU's treaties and secondary law, declarations and resolutions, 
international agreements and judgments made by the Court of Justice. The principle of the 
Community acquis protects EU law from a complete delegalization. More precisely, it is 
always possible for the Member States and the institutions to change the acquis and remove a 
norm from the treaties or secondary law, but there is no general trend whereby the 
introduction of soft law would end up eliminating hard law norms.  
 
1. The Softening of Hard Law 
EU soft law, however, sometimes enters into competition with EU hard law, paving the 
way for possible processes of limited delegalization. The softening of hard law occurs when a 
policy-area, or at least part of it, evolves from hard law to soft law. Again, the principle of the 
Community acquis can have a lock-in effect on EU law. But more and more, the emergence 
of soft law creates ambiguous situations where soft and hard norms are combined (see section 
III, B). In external action, ‘hard’ regulations adopted by the Council are sometimes taken on 
the basis of a ‘soft’ position adopted within the framework of CFSP, as in the case of 
economic sanctions implementing a CFSP position. Environmental policy is often said to 
move away from traditional instruments based on the setting of uniform, legally binding 
norms.77 In the 1990s, the persisting problem of certain Member States’ compliance with the 
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environmental legislation generated scepticism about the effectiveness of harmonization. 
These compliance challenges were addressed through the adoption of less coercive and more 
flexible instruments, belonging to the category of soft law.78 For instance, the Directive on 
Integrative Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC), enacted in 1996, introduced soft, non-
binding targets, and a strong procedural component through the delegation of policy 
formulation to participatory, co-regulatory networks, in a field where legally-binding 
emission limit values on air, land and water used to be applied to several industrial sectors.79 
The open method of coordination also leads to situations of hybridity, defined as 
‘constellations in which both hard and soft processes operate in the same domain and affect 
the same actors’.80 The ‘simultaneous presence of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures in the same 
policy domains’,81 as in employment policy or social policy, may entail a preference for those 
norms that are less constraining for the Member States. This issue has been tackled by the 
Commission in the White Paper on Governance.82  The Commission, the Parliament and 
others keep on demanding that coordination and soft law should not be used when legislative 
action under the Community method is possible. So far, however, there has been little 
empirical evidence that the coordination method has displaced EU legislation.83 In social 
policy, for example, the number of directives has not decreased since the OMC has been 
applied to social protection and social inclusion.84 But it seems that legally binding norms are 
increasingly interconnected with soft rules: national plans for the use of cohesion funds are 
closely integrated with the objectives of the OMC in social and employment fields; ‘hard law’ 
directives ‘increasingly incorporate provisions for implementation, monitoring, evaluation, 
peer review, periodic revision through ‘soft law’ OMC-style procedures’.85 
In sum, the process of limited delegalization is far from being proved in the existing 
literature, due to a deficit in empirical research as well as considerable disagreement between 
researchers on the actual impact of the coordination method. In the meantime, I believe soft 
law norms should be considered as a milestone in a process of legalization, as stressed in the 
following paragraphs.  
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2. The Hardening of Soft Law 
The emergence of new forms of governance has impacted EU law to such an extent that 
processes of limited legalization through soft law are now common practice (see section III, 
A, 2).  But it remains to be seen whether these soft law norms have the potential to transform 
into hard law. EU soft law might not be the final stage of an Europeanization process 
impacting environmental and economic policy and social coordination as well as foreign and 
security policy. It might rather be the first step –or a transition- towards hard law. Complete 
legalization would thus take place in two stages:  creation of soft law / hardening of soft law.  
Justice and home affairs (JHA) is certainly an area where this evolution has occurred 
since 1997 and the Amsterdam treaty. JHA was mostly soft law when instituted as the third 
pillar of the EU by the Maastricht treaty, because the norms in this area, although enshrined in 
binding decisions and framework-decisions, were out of ECJ jurisdictions reach. Then, the 
‘communautarization’ of JHA completed by the Amsterdam treaty transformed those soft 
rules into hard ones, placing them under the jurisdiction of the ECJ (hard enforcement).  
Apart from Justice and home affairs, other policy areas are heading towards hard law. 
The field of human rights protection gives a good example of such an evolution, with the 
European Charter on Fundamental Rights signed in 2000 as a non-biding document and 
transformed into a binding agreement with the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009. In 
the field of the environment, limited cases of soft law’s hardening have been observed.86 The 
same sex union policy offers another good example of soft law hardening.87  
Fiscal discipline, in particular, has evolved from a weak enforcement mechanism to a 
much more constraining and efficient one. This has been done though different improvements 
of the Stability and Growth Pact. As far as the preventive arm is concerned, the Council now 
issues recommendations to the Member States deviating significantly from the medium-term 
budgetary objectives, after a warning addressed by the Commission. If the Member States do not 
comply, this can be followed, for euro area members at least, by a sanction equal to an interest-
bearing deposit of 0.2% of GDP as a rule. Sanctions were not possible before the 2011 reform of 
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the SGP (the Six Paxk). As far as the corrective arm is concerned, the sanctions that are possible 
under the excessive deficit procedure now come into force earlier and more consistently than 
before, due to the so-called ‘Six Pack’. These sanctions are automatically applied, unless the 
Council otherwise decides by qualified majority voting (Six Pack and treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance)88. With the entry into force of the TSCG, the European Court 
of Justice will play a role in enforcing the new budget rules.89 The ECJ may require the 
Member States to implement the budget rules and impose financial sanction (0.1% of GDP) if a 
country fails to comply with this requirement. Compliance with the rules will also be monitored 
at national level by independent institutions.  
Due to these new hard enforcement mechanisms, fiscal surveillance has entered the realm 
of hard law, or if not, has moved very far towards hard law. One limit of this evolution is the lack 
of preciseness of the rules. In spite of the efforts to define notions such as ‘significant deviations 
from the medium-term budgetary objectives’, the rules are still outlined in a quite vague 
manner, in contradiction with the principle of legal certainty.  From the standpoint of the rule of 
law, this is highly problematic. With the most recent evolutions of the EMU, we may have types 
of law where a strong coercion is organized in order to ensure compliance with imprecise rules. 
The possibility of sanctions and the competence of the ECJ make it clear that we are now facing a 
much harder kind of law, but whether this type of law meets the requirements of an effective 
rechsstaat is a matter of discussion. Indeed, it can be argued that a combination of 
institutionalized coercion with rather uncertain norms is not the best way to guarantee civic 
rights. It is true that the precision of the rules increases when the EU institutions interpret the 
macro-economic performance of the Member States, but it means that the Commission and the 
Council have considerable discretion to interpret and adapt the rules.  
However, for our purpose, which is limited to mapping EU soft and hard law, the 
evolutions of EU economic governance remain one of the most interesting case of soft law 
hardening, together with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Justice and home affairs and a few 
others. Now the question is: Can the hardening of soft law become a current practice in the 
European integration processes? Does soft law set the pace for subsequent hard law 
development? For this type of legalization to appear in the European integration process, there 
must be a growing awareness that more binding agreements induce more effective 
compliance, because they are subject to greater oversight. Considering that the main reason 
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for using soft law instruments is to generate compliance whilst avoiding loss of sovereignty, 
two questions arise.  
First, does European soft law succeed in shaping Member States’ public policies and 
legislation?90 Does it produce compliance in domains where hard law is not an option?91 
These questions go far beyond the limited frame of this paper. There is a need for more 
systematic assessments of the EU soft law’s effectiveness.  Researchers often disagree on 
these issues, even when dealing with the same national and sectoral cases.92 For example, the 
influence of the European Employment Strategy in Germany was considered limited by 
some 93  and rather significant by others. 94  Regarding employment and social 
protection/inclusion, Zeitlin95  identified three main changes: 1) substantive policy change 
(changes in national policy thinking, changes in national policy agendas, changes in specific 
national policies); 2) procedural shifts in governance and policy-making arrangements (better 
horizontal coordination of interdependent policy areas, improvements in national steering and 
statistical capacities, enhanced vertical coordination between national governments and the 
region, increased involvement of non-state actors); 3) mutual learning among the Member 
States. Jacobsson has argued that the OMC in employment policy has triggered a subtle 
transformation of states, through discursive regulatory mechanisms and spreading of 
knowledge.96  
The weaknesses of the coordination method have also been acknowledged by scholars, 
some of them doubting the greater effectiveness of soft rules, unless there is a strong shadow 
of hierarchy. 97  Soft law is not ‘a panacea for achieving effective regulations’: ‘non-
hierarchical, private self-regulation or public-private co-regulation require a strong shadow of 
hierarchy to be effective’.98  But there is a need for more in-depth analysis of the resistance to 
soft law. My assumption is that both soft and hard laws generate compliance –and non-
compliance- through the same mechanisms. To say it differently, soft law faces the same 
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attitudes of resistance, retrenchment and inertia that have been studied by the important 
literature on non-compliance with legal norms99.  
Secondly, how do EU institutions and Member States apprehend this issue of 
compliance with EU soft law? Do they promote harder forms of law when confronted with 
the failures of soft governance? Here, the assumption is that, while sovereignty would explain 
the use of soft law, the search for effectiveness would explain its transformation into hard 
law. Thus, the communautarization of Justice and home affairs could be explained by a 
growing awareness that soft law is not effective. The third pillar has been associated with 
lowest common denominator decision-making and implementation deficits.100 In 2008, the 
Commission wrote: ‘the overall general assessment of the Hague programme is rather 
unsatisfactory’.101 This negative view of soft law mechanisms in JHA has been presented 
alongside argumentation in favour of a complete extension of the Community method to the 
JHA field.102  
Moreover, soft law in the European Union is allegedly exposed to more integrative 
dynamics than any other international organization, due to its supranational nature and its 
very large scope of action. Even if there are several examples of international regimes where 
politics have been replaced by soft law, and where soft law has become hard law,103 the most 
prominent example being the World Trade Organization,104 the hardening of soft law is more 
likely to occur in the European Union because the EU is a polity, far from a classic 
international organization. In the European Union, when soft instruments fail to succeed, the 
evolution towards hard law and sanctions remains a credible option, for two main reasons. 
First, knowing that integration through (hard) law has proved effective since the beginning of 
European integration, the effectiveness of ‘soft’ policy-areas should be strengthened by the 
use of hard law. Secondly, several players –Member States or institutions - may push in this 
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direction and try to convince the reluctant actors that opting for the traditional Community 
method is necessary. These EU actors have more regulatory powers than any other actors in 
international organizations. Furthermore, historical and functional perspectives may help 
understanding how these actors can contribute to the transformation of norms in the European 
Union.  
Here, the article reaches its limits. The assumption that the EU, due to its special nature, 
triggers transformations from soft law to hard law, can only be proven through a more 
systematic comparison with other international organizations, which goes far beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
 
Table 7: Legalization / Delegalization in European Integration 
Legalization Delegalization 
Limited 
Legalization 
Complete 
Legalization 
Limited 
Delegalization 
Complete 
Delegalization 
NLN ⇔ Legal 
Norms (soft and 
hard) 
NLN  SL 
Major trend 
since Maastricht 
Additional trend 
until Maastricht 
NLN   HL 
Major trend until 
Maastricht 
Additional trend 
since Maastricht 
SL  NLN 
Non Existent in 
EU Law 
HL  NLN 
Non Existent in 
EU Law 
SL ⇔ HL SL  HL  
(SL Hardening) 
Additional 
Trend since 
Maastricht 
 HL  SL  
(HL Softening) 
Additional 
Trend since 
Maastricht 
 
NLN: Non-Legal Norms     LN: Legal Norms    SL: Soft Law     HL: Hard Law 
 
V. Conclusion 
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The aim of this paper was to identify soft law in the European Union in order to better 
understand the transformations of EU law. The criteria of obligation and enforcement have 
been used to propose a typology of norms that draws a line between soft law and hard law on 
the one hand, soft law and non-legal norms on the other hand. The assumption was that soft 
law couldn’t be assimilated either to a special kind of non-legal norms (having legal 
relevance) or to a special kind of legal norms (softer than the hard ones). Soft law comprises 
both binding and non-binding rules depending on the combination of obligation and 
enforcement.  
When applying the criteria mentioned above, it appears that EU soft law does not differ 
from international soft law, defined as those soft norms generated by international 
organizations and intergovernmental relations. On the one hand, the development of soft law 
in the EU could be seen as a process of ‘normalization’. The use of soft law, together with the 
application of new forms of governance and the relative decline of the Community method, 
would bring the EU closer to classical international organizations.105 Since the 1990s, indeed, 
soft law has developed tremendously in new areas of competence, giving credit to the idea 
that the European Union increasingly resembles an intergovernmental organization.  
On the other hand, the specificity of EU soft law is that it develops within a far more 
integrated system of governance than any other international entity, a kind of polity far from a 
classic international organization. The use of soft law instruments is counterbalanced by a 
series of factors pushing towards legalization. These factors are not unknown in international 
regimes,106 but there is no example of international organization where so many integrative 
dynamics co-exist. Soft law within the EU is subject to integration dynamics to a greater 
extent than it is in other international organizations. The most prominent trend, as the case of 
JHA indicates, seems to be that soft law is a first step towards a more constraining kind of 
law. In the future, we will have to further investigate whether the function of soft law is to 
reduce the supranational character of the European Union through a process of delegalization, 
or, on the contrary, to prepare further integration/legalization.  
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